Call Me BIG PAPA: An Extension of Mason’s  Information Ethics Framework to Big Data by Young, Jacob et al.
Journal of the Midwest Association for Information Systems 
(JMWAIS) 
Volume 2020 
Issue 2 Special Issue - Information Security, 
Privacy, and Ethics 
Article 3 
2020 
Call Me BIG PAPA: An Extension of Mason’s Information Ethics 
Framework to Big Data 
Jacob Young 
Bradley University, jayoung@fsmail.bradley.edu 
Tyler J. Smith 
Bradley University, tjsmith3@fsmail.bradley.edu 
Shawn H. Zheng 
Bradley University, hzheng@fsmail.bradley.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/jmwais 
Recommended Citation 
Young, Jacob; Smith, Tyler J.; and Zheng, Shawn H. (2020) "Call Me BIG PAPA: An Extension of Mason’s 
Information Ethics Framework to Big Data," Journal of the Midwest Association for Information Systems 
(JMWAIS): Vol. 2020 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. 
DOI: 10.17705/3jmwa.000059 
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/jmwais/vol2020/iss2/3 
This material is brought to you by the AIS Affiliated and Chapter Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Midwest Association for Information Systems (JMWAIS) by an 
authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact 
elibrary@aisnet.org. 
Young, Smith, Zheng / Call Me BIG PAPA 
Journal of the Midwest Association for Information Systems | Vol. 2020, Issue 2, July 2020 17 
Journal of the Midwest Association for Information Systems 
Volume 2020 | Issue 2 Article 3 
Date: 07-31-2020 
Call Me BIG PAPA: An Extension of Mason’s 
Information Ethics Framework to Big Data 
Jacob A. Young 
Bradley University, jayoung@fsmail.bradley.edu 
Tyler J. Smith 
Bradley University, tjsmith3@fsmail.bradley.edu 
Shawn H. Zheng 
Bradley University, hzheng@fsmail.bradley.edu 
Abstract 
In 1986, Richard Mason proposed the PAPA framework to address four ethical issues society would likely face in the 
information age: privacy, accuracy, property, and accessibility. In this paper, we propose an extension to the PAPA 
framework by appending three additional issues relevant to information ethics in the big data era. First, we outline the four 
components of Mason’s original PAPA. Second, we briefly review the major technological changes that have occurred since 
Mason proposed his framework. Third, we outline concepts relevant to the big data context. Fourth, we propose and discuss 
our extension by appending three ethical issues related to behavioral surveillance, interpretation, and governance to Mason’s 
original PAPA framework, forming BIG PAPA. Lastly, we discuss how these issues impact practice and how they can 
inform future research. 
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1. Introduction
Just as society entered the information age, Richard Mason proposed his PAPA framework, comprised of privacy, 
accuracy, property, and accessibility (Mason, 1986). Mason’s seminal paper provided a much-needed warning that has 
remained relevant as the foundation of information ethics for decades (Peslak, 2006, p. 117). Unfortunately, it appears 
much of Mason’s message was largely ignored as news of massive security breaches, targeted marketing, and invasive 
tracking technologies litter today’s headlines. 
Although Mason’s original arguments are just as appropriate today, we offer an extension in the context of big data. 
First, we outline the four components of Mason’s original framework. Second, we briefly review the major technological 
changes that have occurred since Mason proposed PAPA. Third, we outline concepts relevant to the big data context to 
establish a contextual foundation. Fourth, we propose and discuss our extension by appending three ethical issues related 
to behavioral surveillance, interpretation, and governance to Mason’s original PAPA framework, forming BIG PAPA. 
Lastly, we discuss how these issues impact practice and how they can inform future research. 
2. Mason’s PAPA Framework
Before discussing our extension, we must first ground our paper by outlining the key elements of Mason’s framework. 
Although Mason recognized that several ethical issues would become increasingly important in the information age, he 
focused his discussion on four primary areas of concern: privacy, accuracy, property, and accessibility. These issues 
were organized into the PAPA acronym. Mason posed several key questions as he introduced an issue, which we have 
summarized in this section. 
2.1. Privacy 
What information about one’s self or one’s associations must a person reveal to others, under what conditions 
and with what safeguards? What things can people keep to themselves and not be forced to reveal to others? 
(Mason, 1986, p. 5). 
Mason provided two examples in his discussion on privacy. First, he recounted an effort by the legislature of the state 
of Florida to assess whether building codes were resulting in underutilized buildings. One study tasked a researcher with 
observing and recording the usage of toilets, mirrors, and sinks in bathroom facilities at Tallahassee Community College. 
As one would expect, the school’s students, faculty, and staff argued that the study invaded their privacy and violated 
their rights. Instead of apologizing, the state claimed that the data being collected was more valuable than the harm it 
caused. Amazingly, it was not until the American Civil Liberties Union got involved that the state finally suspended the 
study. Of course, by that time the state had already collected enough information. 
Mason then illustrated what he coined the threat of exposure by minute description. He noted that users regularly 
provide information to certain parties, but without consenting to that information being shared with others or merged 
into a central database. In his second example, Mason recounted an unsanctioned investigation that occurred when 
curious programmers at the city of Chicago’s computer center began cross-referencing several databases based upon 
employee name and I.D. At first, they identified employees with unpaid parking fines. Next, they discovered employees 
who owed various fees associated with the alcohol and drug abuse program. This was understandably met with outrage 
once news of their activity was leaked to the public. In response, the city then established new rules governing the 
computer center’s operations to better protect employee privacy. 
At that time, minute description was still largely based upon cross-sectional data captured at infrequent intervals. As 
technology evolved, however, collection frequency increased, and the level of detail was enhanced. Mason described 
these connections as threads that would ultimately result in the formation of all-knowing dossiers. These advancements 
have allowed for more threads to be woven within and among datasets, forming a permanent record for every individual. 
Such knowledge is primed for abuse. Not only is someone’s privacy likely to be invaded, if embarrassing information 
falls into the wrong hands it could be leveraged for blackmail. 
2.2. Accuracy 
Who is responsible for the authenticity, fidelity and accuracy of information? Similarly, who is to be held 
accountable for errors in information and how is the injured party to be made whole? (Mason, 1986, p. 5). 
As large datasets become more interconnected, data integrity becomes paramount. Therefore, Mason stressed the 
importance of information accuracy by highlighting specific consequences caused by errors in computerized bank 
transactions and weather forecasts. The first example pertained to a bank’s refusal to acknowledge receipt of a mortgage 
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payment simply because a new computer system did not show it as paid. To prove his claim, the customer, Louis 
Marches, presented his coupon book to show that it had clearly been stamped as “paid” by the bank teller. Instead of 
acknowledging the error, the bank’s employee’s put their faith entirely in the computer system. Compounding the matter 
even further, the bank refused to accept subsequent payments until the “unpaid” payment was satisfied. This continued 
until the bank eventually foreclosed on the property. Making matters even worse, Marches’ wife, who had been in bed 
recovering from a heart attack, suffered a stroke upon learning of the foreclosure from a debt collector. 
The second example tells the tragic story of a man lost at sea in 1980. A weather forecast produced by the National 
Weather Service had stated that a nearby storm would not impact the ship’s course, yet they soon found themselves in 
80 knot winds and seas cresting at 60 feet. The erroneous forecast failed to predict the turbulent conditions due to a faulty 
buoy. Since the forecasting model was without the buoy’s data, it miscalculated the storm’s trajectory by several miles. 
Although both incidents resulted in large settlements to the injured parties, Mason recognized that we run the risk of 
repeating these mistakes if information systems are not carefully developed and tested. 
2.3. Property 
Who owns information? What are the just and fair prices for its exchange? Who owns the channels, especially 
the airways, through which information is transmitted? How should access to this scarce resource be 
allocated? (Mason, 1986, p. 5). 
Mason’s focused his discussion on property around developments in artificial intelligence and the scarce resource of 
communication bandwidth. First, he worried about extraction of novel human thought and ingenuity and its subsequent 
implantation into machines. For example, will those who discover new insights be justly compensated if their ideas are 
replicated into billions of machines? When information is easily copied and transferred, controlling its exchange becomes 
increasingly difficult. 
To illustrate his second concern with communication channels, Mason draws a parallel to Garrett Hardin’s essay, 
“The Tragedy of the Commons.” Since herdsmen directly benefited from each additional animal added to a pasture, but 
only indirectly experienced the costs of grazing, the pasture would eventually be destroyed by overuse. If the 
infrastructure of our data networks is also treated as a commons, we too run the risk of abusing it. On the other hand, 
when a communication medium is owned by a single entity, they wield considerable control over what conversations 
can take place. Therefore, we must find ways to ensure that a balance is found between ownership and access. 
2.4. Accessibility 
What information does a person or an organization have a right or privilege to obtain, under what conditions 
and with what safeguards? (Mason, 1986, p. 5). 
As Mason points out, literacy is critical to one’s participation in, as well as the advancement of, any society. Mason 
explains that literacy goes much further than the ability to read. First, intellectual skills, including the ability to reason 
and calculate, must be developed through education. Second, one must have access to the necessary technology. Lastly, 
information must be accessible, else it cannot be consumed. Mason argues that one’s own knowledge and economic 
status determines whether these three requirements have been met, and to what degree. Although technology has 
advanced rapidly, not all have benefited from it at the same rate. This has resulted in a large segment of the population 
becoming increasingly information poor. Mason continues by describing the necessary steps to access information stored 
in modern databases. Those who cannot complete the steps are likely to become what Mason refers to as “information 
drop outs” who will likely need greater assistance in the future. 
2.5. New Social Contract 
In his concluding remarks, Mason called for a new social contract that would preserve everyone’s right to maximize 
their human potential. He made it clear that the dawn of the information age represented a critical junction for society, 
with the fate of future generations at stake. Mason stressed the importance of developing information systems that would 
“enhance the dignity of mankind” (Mason, 1986, p. 11). Mason hoped that keeping PAPA in the forefront of our minds 
would lead us to make wiser decisions. He encouraged developers to ensure that future information systems: 
• would not “unduly invade a person’s privacy;”
• produce and maintain accurate records;
• protect the available bandwidth to avoid repeating the “Tragedy of the Commons;”
• protect intellectual property; and,
• are widely accessible to foster information literacy.
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In Mason’s words, failing to abide by these guidelines would risk “information bankruptcy or desolation” (Mason, 
1986, p. 11). Unfortunately, despite his best efforts, it seems these lessons were either largely ignored or forgotten over 
the following decades. 
3. Evolution of Technology
“The real danger is the gradual erosion of individual liberties through automation, integration, and 
interconnection of many small, separate record-keeping systems, each of which alone may seem innocuous, 
even benevolent, and wholly justifiable” (U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission, 1977). 
Much has changed since Mason’s PAPA framework was published in 1986, especially as it pertains to data 
production. As Smolan & Erwitt (2012) point out, human civilization had only produced a cumulative total of 5 billion 
gigabytes of data from the beginning of recorded history until 2003. In 2011, we produced 5 billion gigabytes of new 
data every two days. By 2013, the interval was reduced to 10 minutes, and in 2015, just 10 seconds. Such rapid growth 
in data production propelled humanity into the big data era. Although it might sometimes feel like it, we did not get here 
overnight. The big data phenomenon was made possible due to revolutionary technological advancement over several 
decades. 
In the 1980s, personal computing had truly arrived, putting the power of digital creation in the hands of the average 
consumer. The 1990s saw the birth of the Internet as the World Wide Web was made available to the public in 1991. 
Search engines, such as Yahoo! Search and Google, helped users find specific information across the vast sea of newly 
available data. 
Although cellular devices emerged in the 1990s, it was not until the 2000s that mobile devices became readily 
available. Throughout his career as a science fiction writer, David Gerrold naturally made several predictions about 
future technology. Perhaps none rings as true today as Gerrold's (1999, p. 61) contribution to “Smart Reseller” magazine: 
I've got a cell phone, a pocket organizer, a beeper, a calculator, a digital camera, a pocket tape recorder, a 
music player, and somewhere around here, I used to have a color television. Sometime in the next few years, 
all of those devices are going to meld into one. It will be a box less than an inch thick and smaller than a deck 
of cards…I call this device a Personal Information Telecommunications Agent, or Pita for short. The acronym 
also can stand for Pain In The Ass, which it is equally likely to be, because having all that connectivity is 
going to destroy what's left of everyone's privacy. 
Clearly, Gerrold’s vision could not have been more prophetic. At the turn of the millennium, roughly 37 percent of 
Americans had a mobile phone, reaching 90 percent by the end of the decade (Kornstein, 2015). Smartphones, such as 
Apple’s iPhone, significantly elevated mobile device capabilities, and ultimately realized Gerrold’s Pita fears. 
In 2009, electronic health records were mandated in the United States through the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act) to streamline medical care. The 2010s saw wide adoption of social 
media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, promising to “connect you with the people around you,” and the growth 
of artificial intelligence and predictive analytics (Power, 2016). Despite utopian ideals, technology was so disruptive 
during the 2010s that it has been considered by some as “The Decade Tech Lost Its Way” (Rahimian & Kelly). 
4. Big Data Concepts
To deal with the emerging challenges created by these technology advancements, Doug Laney (2001) proposed a 
three-dimensional data challenge framework with fast increasing data volume, velocity and variety, which has become 
ubiquitous in definitions of big data. More recently, Van Rijmenam (2014) suggested including veracity, variability, 
value, and visualization. In this section, we briefly define and discuss these terms to form our contextual foundation. 
Data volume is increasing exponentially. Gantz and Reinsel (2012) estimated that the total size of the digital universe 
in 2010 stood at 1.2 zettabytes (ZB). It was estimated to increase to 4.4 ZB by 2013 and was expected to grow 40% per 
year into next decade, almost doubling the size every two years (Gantz & Reinsel, 2012). By their estimates, the total 
size of digital universe in 2020 will likely reach 40 ZB (Gantz & Reinsel, 2012). 
Van Rijmenam (2014, p. 5) referred to velocity as “the speed at which data is created, stored, analyzed, and 
visualized.” The rapid growth and abundance of emerging technologies such as sensors, connected devices, smart 
personal/home/office devices, 5G networks, mobile devices, autonomous automobiles, cloud services, e-health, and 
virtual reality, collectively accelerated the need for real-time data accumulation (Ariyaluran Habeeb et al., 2019). 
Velocity is generally captured through two traits: (1) frequency of generation; (2) frequency of handing, recording, and 
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publishing (Kitchin & McArdle, 2016). However, to holistically understand the velocity of big data, we must not only 
embrace technological advancement, but also simultaneously address potential privacy and security issues. 
Variety refers to a wide range of data types, which include structured, unstructured, and semi-structured, as well as 
various data sources. Structured data usually resides in relational databases and is characterized by pre-defined and 
searchable fields. For instance, customer records such as name, phone numbers and Zip codes stored in a customer 
relationship management system or sensory device seeks to create a continuous, longitudinal record of usage. Data may 
be human or machine generated within the relational databases. Unstructured data on the other hand is not constrained 
by pre-defined data models or schema and resides in NoSQL databases. Common examples of unstructured data are text, 
audio, video files and images. Semi-structured data is a hybrid of structured and unstructured data. It usually has some 
defining characteristics but does not conform to a structure as rigid as what we see in relational databases (Kitchin & 
McArdle, 2016). For instance, pictured taken on a smart with mobile devices, are unstructured but are often geo tagged 
and time stamped.  
Veracity describes the degree to which data is truthful and trusted. Veracity is increasingly being recognized as it is 
an essential component to extract value from big data. Veracity comprehensively describes data quality and can be 
translated to the reliability or consistency of the data (Gupta & Rani, 2019), or confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the data (Kepner et al., 2014). A wide range of factors can sacrifice data veracity depending on the type of data and 
the stage of data analysis, for example, inherent biases in data processing, untrustworthy data sources, and abnormalities. 
Common examples include user entry errors, duplication, and corruption, all of which pose threats to the potential value 
of big data. 
Variability considers the inconsistencies of the data flow. Data loads become challenging to maintain at the same 
speed, especially with an increase in social media usage, which generally causes a peak in data loads when certain events 
occur (Katal, Wazid, & Goudar, 2013). Other variability issues relate to the multitude of data dimensions, types, and 
sources that eventually lead to the inconsistencies in the data. 
Data validity in a statistical sense addresses the degree to which the tool measures what it claims to measure (Kelley, 
1927). In the big data context, it refers to the correctness of data for its intended use (Gupta & Rani, 2019). For instance, 
sentiment analysis has recently become extremely popular in dealing with user-generated text data across social media 
platforms as it provides either positive, negative, or neutral sentiment predictions. While sentiment analysis can be a 
powerful tool in certain contexts, such as political campaigns, it has unknown validity for emotions of interest incapable 
to detect mood. For example, a customer with the verified purchase tag on Amazon writes a sarcastic review on a product. 
Although the review possesses veracity, it can easily be interpreted as a positive review. In this case, the sentiment 
analysis fails to capture the intended sarcasm and thus undermining the data validity.  
Data’s perceived value largely drives corporations to collect as much data as frequently as possible. While technology 
provided the spark, the insatiable appetite added the necessary fuel to spawn the big data inferno. Data’s potential value 
is rooted in a desire to gain new insights, and subsequently, transform these insights into proper and timely actions that 
were not feasible before. When data is collected, sold, exchanged, data becomes a commodity that possesses value, the 
true value of big data, however, lies in the process of finding insights (Gupta & Rani, 2019). For example, the department 
store Macy’s adjusts nearly 73 million items based on demand and supply in near-real-time for them to maximize profit. 
In a similar vein, retail giant Walmart utilizes semantic and text mining techniques to create better search results for its 
website that results in increased revenues (Desjardins, 2015). 
Visualization refers to the use of visual elements such as charts, graphs, and maps to represent information and data 
(Tableau Software). The volume, veracity, and variety that characterizes big data make it particularly challenging to 
conduct visualization (Chen & Zhang, 2014). Firms not only use data visualization tools (e.g., Tableau, Chartist, Grafana, 
and D3.js) to transform large and complex data sets into simplistic, yet interactive pictures and dashboards to aid decision 
making, they also integrate user data with in-app visualizations. This is a common practice in social media platforms, 
such as the Snap Map from Snapchat, Find My Device service from Apple, as well as interactive filters from Snapchat 
and Instagram. 
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5. BIG PAPA
Twenty years after Mason’s PAPA was published, Peslak (2006) reaffirmed the relative importance of the four 
original components. Privacy was perceived as the most important ethical issue, followed by accessibility, accuracy, and 
property. In this section, we suggest adding three issues (behavioral surveillance, interpretation, and governance) to the 
PAPA framework and propose an extension that we refer to as BIG PAPA. 
Although Mason explored these interrelated ideas in his original work, we believe that our proposed extensions should 
be considered distinct issues in the context of big data. As shown in Figure 1, the behavior issue is primarily rooted in 
Mason’s discussion on privacy, whereas interpretation is a subset of Mason’s accuracy issue. Our standalone governance 
issue is formed from Mason’s call for adequate safeguards throughout PAPA. 
Figure 1. 
While these issues are certainly not new, early concerns were focused on small silos of data. Therefore, any negative 
impact that could be caused by unethical behavior was naturally constrained. As technology and data consumption grew, 
these issues became more important. We illustrate this development by loosely overlapping each issue with data prior to 
the big data era (Figure 2), whereas each issue has become fully entrenched by big data in recent years (Figure 3). 
Figure 2. Pre-Big Data Era Figure 3. Post-Big Data Era 
The seven issues that form BIG PAPA, as well as related questions, are provided in Table 1. We discuss each issue 
in the context of how big data has impacted society. We provide several examples to highlight the importance of our 
extension, as well as how Mason’s original issues (privacy, accuracy, property, and accessibility) have evolved. 
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Issue Related Questions 
B 
Behavioral 
Surveillance 
• How can users be better informed before making an active choice to share data?
• How do we preserve individual liberty when behavior is constantly monitored?
I Interpretation 
• How can we avoid developing flawed models built upon erroneous or incomplete data?
• How can we reduce the likelihood of drawing erroneous conclusions?
• How can we educate others to recognize poor analyses?
G Governance 
• What controls are in place to handle ethical challenges related to big data?
• Who will watch the watchmen?
P Privacy1 
• What information about one’s self or one’s associations must a person reveal to others?
• Under what conditions and with what safeguards?
• What things can people keep to themselves and not be forced to reveal to others?
A Accuracy1 
• Who is responsible for the authenticity, fidelity, and accuracy of information?
• Similarly, who is to be held accountable for errors in information?
• How is the injured party to be made whole?
P Property1 
• Who owns information?
• What are the just and fair prices for its exchange?
• Who owns the channels, especially the airways, through which information is transmitted?
• How should access to this scarce resource be allocated?
A Accessibility1 
• What information does a person or an organization have a right or a privilege to obtain?
• Under what conditions and with what safeguards?
1 Mason’s original PAPA framework 
Table 1. BIG PAPA Framework 
5.1. Behavioral Surveillance 
How can users be better informed before making an active choice to share data? How do we preserve 
individual liberty when behavior is constantly monitored? 
When our every move, message, or even thought is being surveilled, it can have a chilling effect on our behavior 
(Lashmar, 2017; Richards, 2012; Stoycheff, 2016). Therefore, we focus this issue on any data that can reveal individual 
activity, such as location, communication, and digital interaction. Mason’s discussion of privacy is certainly related to 
behavior, but technology at that time did not allow for the refined, targeted, and continuous data collection that is 
conducted today. Instead, most data were consciously provided by users themselves. Thus, we discuss behavior that is 
observed by virtue of active choices made by a user, as well as behavior data acquired through passive means of 
observation and collection. For example, a user might knowingly elect to share such data by making an active choice to 
opt in to obtain the benefits of a given product or service, or the behavior data could be passively collected without any 
clear user awareness or consent. 
5.1.1. Active Choice 
“Historically, a conversation that you might have in the hallway is private by default, public through 
effort…Conversely, when you engage online in equally public settings such as on someone's Facebook Wall, 
the conversation is public by default, private through effort. You actually have to think about making 
something private because, by default, it is going to be accessible to a much broader audience” (Boyd, 2010). 
When users make conscious choices to engage in certain behavior, they must assume some level of risk, even if their 
assessment of the risk does not reflect reality. For example, many subscribe to the idea that they are doing nothing wrong, 
and therefore have “nothing to hide” to justify their oversharing behavior (D. J. Solove, 2007). Yet, when questioned on 
the issue, most will quickly concede that they wear clothes, put curtains on their windows, and lock the door when they 
go to the bathroom. Until users come to the realization that they should care about protecting digital behavior just as 
much as their physical activity, it is difficult to demonstrate how their actions can jeopardize their privacy and security. 
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Sadly, there are countless instances of technology use resulting in serious consequences that users never fully 
anticipated yet would never have been possible without their active involvement in adopting the technology. Nude photos 
have been stolen from cloud backups and distributed online (Peterson, Yahr, & Warrick, 2014). Residences have been 
broken into after occupants reveal on social media that they will not be home for an extended period (Sanchez-Garrido, 
2016). Smartwatch data uploaded to fitness websites has exposed sensitive locations, including military bases (Hern, 
2018). Hackers have spied on and harassed vulnerable children when insecure baby monitors and cameras are connected 
to the Internet (Chiu, 2019). 
Of course, we are not blaming victims for the illegal actions of others, but we do advocate for the development of 
basic security and privacy competencies before choosing to adopt certain technologies. Unfortunately, it is usually only 
after personally experiencing negative effects that they are motivated to modify their behavior to reduce future risk. 
Ignorance may be bliss, but that does not change the fact that individual behavior regularly undermines their own privacy, 
security, and liberty. Obviously, much of this issue can be attributed to poor consumer awareness, which we will discuss 
later. 
5.1.2. Passive Observation and Collection 
“No one disputes that the deployment of cheap, ubiquitous video cameras has made an environment of near 
total surveillance technologically feasible. Whether that's a good thing or a bad thing, however, depends on 
how much you trust the cameraman” (Grossman, 2001). 
After it was discovered that the National Football League had secretly agreed to allow police to use facial recognition 
technology to search for criminals among attendees of Super Bowl XXXV, the game became scornfully known as the 
“Snooper Bowl” (Brey, 2004; Grossman, 2001). Today, companies such as Clearview AI are scraping image data from 
publicly available resources, such as social media, to improve the accuracy of their facial recognition system (Hill, 2020). 
These efforts have caused many to question whether participating in seemingly innocent social media fads, such as the 
Facebook’s “10 Year Challenge,” is only helping to train facial recognition algorithms to better predict aging effects 
(O’Neill, 2019). 
While it is understood that individuals should not expect privacy in public spaces, the invasive surveillance technology 
that has developed in the big data era has taken ‘Big Brother’ to the extreme (Power, 2016). The precision and pervasive 
nature of the countless devices designed to track identifiable individuals today has only amplified its impact on society 
(Joh, 2016). For example, computer vision can be used to track vehicles through license plate readers (Lum, Hibdon, 
Cave, Koper, & Merola, 2011; National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, 2010; Ozer, 2010; Zmud, 
Wagner, Moran, & George, 2016) and law enforcement agencies have deployed International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity-catchers, also known as stingray devices (Bates, 2016; Boyne, 2016; Norman, 2016; Pell & Soghoian, 2014). 
Stingray devices pose as cell phone towers to eavesdrop on cellular communication, uniquely identify citizens, and track 
their movements. Fortunately, as Power (2016) points out, U.S. courts have found several innovative investigatory 
techniques to be unconstitutional, such as the use of thermal imaging to peer inside homes to detect marijuana plants or 
the placement of GPS tracking devices onto vehicles without warrants. 
However, the government does not fund the bulk of these surveillance systems. Much of the tracking technology is 
developed, financed, and implemented by technology companies under a “surveillance as a service” business model 
(West, 2019). Because the data is already being collected and stored by the private sector, access can easily be granted 
to a variety of interested parties, such as law enforcement and data brokers—companies who buy, sell, and exchange 
data (Otto, Anton, & Baumer, 2007). For example, Amazon has been criticized for sharing home surveillance videos 
captured by its Ring products with police departments without obtaining warrants (Cox, 2019). Instead, investigators 
simply need to acquire consent from owners of the recording device, effectively creating a surveillance network that 
bypasses court oversight. Considering that Amazon incentivizes police departments to promote Ring products, 
consumers are essentially encouraged to fund a budding surveillance state out of their own pocket. Not only do 
consumers have to worry about how their data will be collected and shared by companies without their knowledge, they 
should also be concerned about how vulnerabilities in these devices can expose such data to other parties (“Ring under 
fire over weakness in video device security,” 2020). 
Another example is Nextdoor, a social media platform that claims to be “the best way to stay informed about what’s 
going on in your neighborhood” and states the following in their privacy policy (Nextdoor, 2019): 
“If you decide to invite new members to join Nextdoor, you can choose to share their residential or email 
address with us, or share your contacts with us, so we can send an invitation and follow-up reminders to 
potential new members on your behalf.” 
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Rather than solicit the information directly, Nextdoor actively encourages new and existing members to divulge the 
personal information of others, without their neighbors’ knowledge or consent. The neighborhood monitoring made 
possible through NextDoor can be referred to as a form of lateral surveillance, where citizens take an active role in 
monitoring the behavior of others, which was traditionally left to professionals (Andrejevic, 2004). While many 
recognize the inherent privacy risks associated with using such services (Masden, Grevet, Grinter, Gilbert, & Edwards, 
2014), those who use Nextdoor are unlikely to recognize how their actions have the potential to cause real harm to others, 
such as those who do not wish to have sensitive information shared when relocating to escape abusive relationships 
and/or domestic violence. Further, such services have the potential to perpetuate discrimination, effectively building a 
“digitally gated community” (Kurwa, 2019). 
In Mason’s call for a new social contract, he sought information systems that would not “unduly invade a person’s 
privacy to avoid the indignities that the students in Tallahassee suffered” (Mason, 1986, p. 11). Regardless of whether 
an individual actively consents to their behavior being monitored, the level of detail captured by modern devices is not 
consistent with this noble goal. Is this the role that we want technology to play in our society? If not, we must make an 
active stand to reclaim our privacy. 
5.2. Interpretation 
How can we avoid developing flawed models built upon erroneous or incomplete data? How can we reduce 
the likelihood of drawing erroneous conclusions? How can we educate others to recognize poor analyses? 
Although obtaining a census is far more possible in the big data era (Kitchin & McArdle, 2016), most analyses are 
still dependent upon samples. Models are built to infer relationships and predict future events. Therefore, as analytical 
capability advances, we must first guard against developing flawed models built upon erroneous or incomplete data, then 
avoid acting upon biased or incorrect conclusions. While Mason’s inclusion of accuracy might appear to satisfy this 
issue, we argue that one can have accurate data, yet still form incorrect conclusions due to poor modeling and/or flawed 
interpretations. Therefore, we have teased out this issue from Mason’s broader discussion on accuracy. 
5.2.1. Garbage In, Garbage Out 
In Weapons of Math Destruction, Cathy O’Neil (2016) explains how reliance on algorithms based upon flawed data 
can have disastrous consequences for society, such as reinforcing discriminatory practices, and at a massive scale. For 
example, facial recognition algorithms have been shown to have unacceptable accuracy rates and to further perpetuate 
inherent biases (Snow, 2018). 
Further, because most algorithms are developed to gain a competitive advantage, and thus considered proprietary, we 
have limited visibility into how they were formed and are being employed. Efforts such as NIST’s Facial Recognition 
Vendor Test (FRVT) have focused primarily on algorithm efficiency and effectiveness, not detecting flaws due to biased 
data (Introna & Wood, 2004). If algorithms are implemented before independent and comprehensive testing can be 
conducted, the impact of big data is more likely to result in harmful outcomes, even if the original motivations are well 
intended. 
Given the constant creep towards predictive policing (Benbouzid, 2019; Joh, 2016), such as attempting to identify 
terrorists based upon whether they have purchased a life insurance policy (Van Rijmenam, 2014, p. 85), it is clear that 
this issue could not be more critical today. Therefore, it is essential for those dependent upon big data to ensure that 
analytic output meets information quality standards (Lee, Strong, Kahn, & Wang, 2002), especially before such results 
are applied to practice. 
5.2.2. Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics 
The rush to employ analytics can also place tremendous power in the hands of untrained individuals. As Wheelan 
(2013, p. 95) plainly put it, “statistics cannot be any smarter than the people who use them. And in some cases, they can 
make smart people do dumb things.” One such example is referred to as the prosecutor’s fallacy (Fenton & Neil, 2011). 
Assume that an expert witness from a scientific laboratory correctly testifies that a given piece of biometric evidence, 
such as a fingerprint or DNA, can be attributed to one out of one million Americans. When a prosecutor later argues that 
the chances of the defendant not being the guilty party are 0.0001%, they are incorrectly interpreting the statistic. If there 
are 300 million people in the United States, the evidence could be attributed to a pool of 300 potential suspects. Therefore, 
the probability that the evidence does not belong to the defendant is 99.67% (299/300). These types of damning errors 
are simply not acceptable, especially when life and liberty is at stake. 
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In the legal arena, the onus is on the states and the federal government to train their prosecutors on how to interpret 
and use statistical data. Even so, the Innocence Project and the Innocence Network, a group of independent organizations 
that work to exonerate wrongfully convicted people often by using DNA to prove innocence. Since the project began, 
367 people have been exonerated, including 21 that have served time on death row (Innocence Project, 2020). 
Approximately 44% of those exonerated are reported to have been wrongly convicted due to a misapplication of forensic 
science. 
5.2.3. Calling Bullshit 
As data becomes more accessible and as society grows increasingly reliant on data-driven products, we must not only 
guard against conducting poor statistical analyses, but also better educate the average citizen to recognize flawed claims. 
To combat this emerging issue, Carl Bergstrom and Jevin West developed a course at the University of Washington 
entitled “Calling Bullshit: Data Reasoning in a Digital World” (https://callingbullshit.org). Bergstrom and West (2020) 
West define such bullshit as “language, statistical figures, data graphics, and other forms of presentation intended to 
persuade by impressing and overwhelming a reader or listener, with a blatant disregard for truth and logical coherence.” 
Regardless of the method of delivery, we must ensure that both producers and consumers of data understand the inherent 
risks associated with statistical analyses. 
5.3. Governance 
What controls are in place to handle ethical challenges related to big data? Who will watch the watchmen? 
Governance involves ensuring that necessary controls are in place to handle future ethical challenges (Smith, Milberg, 
& Burke, 1996). While Mason (1986) did call for safeguards to protect individuals from unethical behavior, these 
arguments were embedded within each issue. We believe that governance, or the lack thereof, in the big data era is an 
issue in and of itself. We discuss governance with respect to the roles industry and government should play in mitigating 
unethical and illegal behavior (Richards & King, 2014). 
5.3.1. Industry 
Governance currently operates under an idealistic model of shared responsibility among industry, government, and 
consumer. Industry groups and professional associations are expected to adhere to codes of conduct, government 
regulators provide enforcement and ensure adequate safeguards are in place, and consumers must make informed 
choices. Self-regulation is certainly preferable, but when self-regulation fails, the consequences of illegal and unethical 
behavior must be severe enough to deter others. Unfortunately, as with all ideals, they are rarely achieved as envisioned. 
Although Equifax agreed to pay up to $700 million as part of a settlement in response to their 2017 data breach, only 
$425 million would go towards compensating approximately 147 million affected consumers (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2019). Equifax exposed names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, physical addresses, and other 
personal information. Considering the severity of the breach, averaging under $3.00 per victim is offensive, and certainly 
does not make anyone whole, as is a major purpose of bringing a tort lawsuit. 
Perhaps more egregious is the fact that Google was only fined $7 million after its Street View mapping project was 
caught secretly capturing passwords, e-mail addresses, medical and financial records, and other personal information as 
Google’s vehicles traveled nearly every road in the country (Streitfeld, 2013). Considering the value this data holds, such 
a small fine does not even register as a slap on Google’s wrist. 
Clearly, self-regulation under the shared responsibility approach has not been effective in discouraging unethical 
practices, particularly when penalties are not proportional to offenses. This reality has led to calls for much needed 
reform of the data broker industry (Kuempel, 2016). However, most companies in the era of big data could be classified 
as data brokers, especially when one considers the volume, velocity, and variety of the data they collect. Therefore, we 
argue that far more comprehensive reform is needed for society to have any hope of meaningfully curtailing unethical 
data practices. 
5.3.2. Governments 
“So this is how liberty dies…with thunderous applause” – Queen Padmé Amidala in Star Wars: Episode III 
- Revenge of the Sith (Lucas, 2005).
For as long as industry produces data, governments at all levels will be waiting to tap in. In the U.S. alone, the federal 
government has attempted to achieve key escrow by building backdoors into phone hardware with the Clipper chip 
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(Abelson et al., 2015), used the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to justify global mass surveillance (Kirk, 2014), 
and pressured technology companies to break their own devices following the terrorist shooting in San Bernardino, 
California (Hack, 2016; Newkirk, 2018). 
Despite passionate pleas in the name of national security, these programs are regularly found to be wasteful, 
ineffective, and unconstitutional once they are subject to critical review and oversight from independent bodies. For 
example, the government was forced to admit that the mass surveillance programs revealed by Edward Snowden failed 
to thwart any terrorist threats that were not already detected through traditional methods (Medine, Brand, Cook, 
Dempsey, & Wald, 2014a, 2014b). 
As one might expect, Dinev, Hart, & Mullen (2008) found that users’ willingness to provide personal information is 
negatively influenced by privacy and government intrusion concerns yet is positively influenced by users’ perceived 
need for government surveillance. These concerns can be seen in the effort that ultimately led San Francisco, ironically 
in the heart of Silicon Valley, to ban the use of facial recognition (Barber, 2019). However, these restrictions only prevent 
city agencies from purchasing surveillance technology, leaving the door open for corporations to share data with 
government officials. In 2009, Eric Schmidt, then CEO of Google, had the following to say with respect to industry 
cooperation with government demands: 
“I think judgment matters. If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't 
be doing it in the first place. If you really need that kind of privacy, the reality is that search engines -- 
including Google -- do retain this information for some time and it's important, for example, that we are all 
subject in the United States to the Patriot Act and it is possible that all that information could be made 
available to the authorities.” (Schneier, 2009). 
This mindset is consistent with the “surveillance as a service” concept (West, 2019), where private firms are complicit 
in doing the government’s bidding. However, given society’s reliance on technology, if our only hope to maintain privacy 
is by “not doing” something, we would be prevented from essential activities, such as making financial transactions, 
receiving medical treatment, and merely existing in public places. Clearly, such a standard is not acceptable in a free 
society, yet similar statements are commonly repeated by government leaders and those responsible for the world’s 
largest technology companies. 
As Scott McNealy, cofounder of Sun Microsystems, famously proclaimed in 1999, “You have zero privacy 
anyway…Get over it” (Sprenger, 1999). Yet, in 2015, he stated that “It scares me to death when the NSA or the IRS 
know things about my personal life and how I vote. Every American ought to be very afraid of big government” (Noyes, 
2015). Likewise, Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, who has built his social media empire on “making people more 
open and connected” with little regard to limiting the sharing of data to third parties, paid more than $30 million for four 
houses surrounding his own residence in an effort to protect his own personal privacy (Nicks, 2016). 
Given that industry struggles to self-regulate and some of the most invasive practices have been employed by 
governments, perhaps we should look elsewhere for a solution to the governance problem? One intriguing option is self-
sovereign identity (Mühle, Grüner, Gayvoronskaya, & Meinel, 2018; Tobin & Reed, 2017). Self-sovereign identity 
allows a user to share the minimum level of detail for a given situation by presenting verifiable claims. 
For example, consider a situation where an individual must prove that they are of a certain age. Instead of being forced 
to produce a driver’s license or other official document that unnecessarily reveals sensitive information, he or she could 
simply present a verifiable claim that has been digitally signed by a government agency. The claim could be as simple 
as stating that the individual is over 18 years old. Not only does this prove eligibility, it does so without sharing any other 
sensitive information typically present on other authoritative documents, such as birthdate or home address. 
While this is an extremely simple example, self-sovereign identity can be used for just about any conceivable use 
case. Ultimately, self-sovereign identity puts control back into the hands of the individual rather than continue to populate 
centralized repositories maintained by increasingly powerful data brokers and governments. Widespread adoption of 
self-sovereign identity would dramatically curb the current appetite for consumer data by starving data brokers of the 
minute description that makes a dataset so valuable. 
5.4. Privacy 
Mason’s discussion on privacy highlighted the early beginnings of what would later become known as data brokers. 
These companies are motivated to obtain as much data as possible due to both perceived and real value. While data 
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brokers certainly present a significant threat to privacy, we approach the issue by focusing on consumer awareness, calls 
for the “right to be forgotten,” as well as how privacy rights have been viewed in both common law and statutes. 
5.4.1. Consumer Awareness 
Several measures have been developed to assess consumer privacy concerns: Smith, Milberg, & Burke (1996) 
developed their global information privacy concern (GIPC) scale; Stewart & Segars (2002) developed the Concern for 
Information Privacy Instrument; and, Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal (2004) developed the Internet Users' Information 
Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) instrument. Studies have also focused on particular use cases. For example, Bélanger, Hiller, 
& Smith (2002) investigated how four trust indices impacted consumer perceptions of privacy in e-commerce and Awad 
& Krishnan (2006) found that consumers who valued information transparency were less likely to provide information 
to aid in personalized marketing. 
While this stream of research has yielded insights regarding privacy concerns, improving consumer awareness in 
practice has been a challenge, especially when the primary method of delivery has been through terms of service and 
privacy policies. Milne, Culnan, & Greene (2006) evaluated over three hundred privacy notices and concluded that in 
just two years, notice readability had declined, while length had increased. McDonald & Cranor (2008) later estimated 
that it would take approximately 244 hours per year for an individual to read the privacy policies for each website visited. 
Further, most terms of service agreements must be accepted in their entirety, which prevents users from negotiating fairer 
exchanges (Walker, 2012). Although there have been attempts to simplify terms of service, such as “Terms of Service; 
Didn’t Read” (https://tosdr.org/), placing the privacy burden entirely on the consumer is not only unreasonable, but 
completely impractical for those who value their privacy, yet do not understand the risks associated with certain 
technology. 
Boritz & No (2011) discovered that much of the privacy research had been conducted in the early 2000s, creating a 
void that was not accounting for rapidly developing technology. Several other studies have reviewed privacy literature 
in information systems (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Pavlou, 2011; Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011) in an effort to spur future 
privacy research. Lowry, Dinev, & Willison (2017) encouraged researchers to treat security and privacy as an IS artifact. 
However, despite greater attention to the privacy issue in academia, it is difficult to see any substantial progress being 
made in practice with respect to increasing consumer awareness. 
5.4.2. Right to be Forgotten 
One of the reasons it has been difficult for the average consumer to anticipate negative consequences of certain 
technologies is due to the impressive speed at which they have advanced. Without having enough time to observe and 
process how these developments might impact them, many participate, only to eventually find themselves regretting 
previous behavior, such as posting personal information on social media (Rosen, 2012). 
Because of this, many have called for an online undo option, or Ctrl+Z (Jones, 2016), known as the “right to be 
forgotten,” that would allow users to remove information from the seemingly permanent record made possible through 
the Internet. In January 2012, the European Commission announced that they would recognize this right, which was 
formally adopted in 2016. Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship, 
explained the basic premise behind the right to be forgotten: “If an individual no longer wants his personal data to be 
processed  or  stored  by  a  data  controller,  and  if  there  is  no  legitimate  reason  for keeping it, the data should be 
removed from their system” (Reding, 2012, p. 5). 
Despite the obvious benefits, valid criticisms against the right to be forgotten have been raised regarding how it might 
conflict with the rights of others, namely rights to free speech and freedom of expression (Walker, 2012). However, 
proponents recognize that requests to remove information under the right to be forgotten should be limited to content 
that the subjects of the data uploaded themselves (Ausloos, 2012; Walker, 2012). This approach respects individual 
privacy yet prevents the right to be forgotten from becoming a magic eraser that can be used to censor others. 
Complicating the issue from a practical standpoint, however, is that content submitted by users can propagate to other 
online services (Ausloos, 2012), whose right to share would then be protected by their own freedom of expression. 
Further, content marked for deletion could still exist on data backups for a considerable amount of time. Therefore, the 
unfortunate reality is that the only reliable way for users to prevent others from maintaining a permanent record is to 
avoid sharing or allowing the data to be collected in the first place. 
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5.4.3. Right to Privacy in Common Law 
In their seminal law review article, Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis (1890) recognized that U.S. law was beginning 
to distinguish physical and psychological harms. The common law up to this point only recognized physical harms, such 
as battery. As Warren and Brandeis pointed out, the law began to recognize psychological harm that can result from the 
reasonable apprehension of physical harm. Warren and Brandeis applied this extension to scenarios involving publishing 
psychological damaging information in tabloids. The traditional common law notions of property, contracts, and 
copyright were inadequate to remedy psychological harms. Common law remedies still may not be adequate today. 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 293 (3rd Cir., 2016), involved a class action filed on behalf of 
13-year-old plaintiff’s alleging that Google and Viacom unlawfully collected information on the websites and videos the
children viewed. The Plaintiffs claimed Google and Viacom committed the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
One of the four types of invasion of privacy torts, a defendant is found liable for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion
when the plaintiff can show (1) an intentional intrusion (2) upon the seclusion of another that is (3) highly offensive to
a reasonable person. Though the plaintiff’s other claims failed, the plaintiffs in Nickelodeon were successfully able to
prove that Google and Viacom had committed the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. What is highly offensive in the context
of this tort to a reasonable person is guided by court decisions and lawyer arguments.
5.4.4. Right to Privacy in Statutes 
Though some sectors in the United States are regulated in terms of privacy, some are not. The “sectoral approach” to 
privacy regulation creates a patchwork of legislation that overlaps in multiple areas of the economy and does not at all 
regulate in others (D. Solove, 2015). Some members of Congress have supported legislation to create a federal privacy 
law, though the efforts have yet to go anywhere. Giving a private cause of action and the preemption state privacy laws 
are some continual sticking points (Feiner, 2019).  
The other approach to privacy regulation is the “omnibus approach” taken by the European Union. This approach is 
designed to regulate privacy no matter the sector and impacts American business, or any business that does business with 
citizens of the EU. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been in effect for over a year and is a significant 
step in improving privacy regulation (Burgess, 2019). The GDPR attempts to alter how businesses handle their 
information and give consumers more control over their information.  
While Congress has been unable to pass comprehensive bi-partisan legislation, some states have filled the gap. The 
California Consumer Privacy Act is the most recent state level legislation to directly address information privacy. This 
law is designed to allow consumers the ability to ask companies that collect data on consumers to see the information. 
Consumers can see personal data to include smartphone data, physical locations, and biometric data (Cowan & Singer, 
2020). 
The right to privacy is right difficult to define in the law, yet should be central to discussion on data and its use. Many 
laws dealing with privacy are centered on the premise that consumers will understand how their data is being used simply 
by being told. This fails to account for the true understanding of the content in the disclosure and does not adequately 
protect consumers. The right to be forgotten, much like the general right to privacy, is not easily implemented. The 
approach taken in the United States, based primarily on informed consent, is a confusing patchwork that leaves gaps in 
some areas and overlaps in others. The omnibus approach taken by the EU with the GDRP, is a significant step forward 
in creating an effective framework for the protection of consumer data. 
Given the speed at which technology advances, it is unlikely for any law to fully protect privacy. The right to be 
forgotten is a desirable option, but the only guaranteed defense is to never share sensitive information in the first place. 
Therefore, it is imperative for consumers to understand how to protect their own interests. 
5.5. Accuracy 
Mason’s accuracy issue primarily related to misinformation; errors and omissions that undermine data authenticity, 
fidelity, and accuracy. However, when it comes to the big data era, privacy advocates and industry should also be 
interested in how countermeasures can undermine all three characteristics. For example, obfuscation and disinformation 
can be employed by users to protect their privacy by shielding activity or information from others. 
5.5.1. Misinformation 
Mason focused his discussion on misinformation, such as inaccurate or incomplete data, and this issue could not be 
more relevant today. For example, a common remedy to data breaches, as will be discussed below, is to offer credit 
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monitoring services. However, merely being told about a potentially material error on one’s credit report is not enough 
as it is often difficult to correct. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, firms must “adopt reasonable procedures for 
meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is 
fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such 
information…” (15 U.S.C § 1681 (b)). 
Those “reasonable procedures” however, often result in significant errors that can require consumers to expend great 
energy, often to no avail, to resolve grave errors on their credit reports. More than one in five consumers have a 
“potentially material error” on their credit report (Klein, 2017). The errors may not originate from the reporting agency 
since they merely collect what data they are given, as was the case when the Social Security Administration mistakenly 
lists 6,000 people a year as deceased. One consumer did not discover that her credit report indicated she was deceased 
until she went to apply for an auto loan (T. Anderson, 2017). 
5.5.2. Obfuscation 
Given the overwhelming number of ways that one’s privacy and security can be violated, it is certainly understandable 
why many resign themselves to living in what can appear to be an inescapable panopticon. Yet, for those who seek out 
solutions, there are several tools available to increase user anonymity and obfuscate their activity (Bazzell, 2019). 
For example, Howe (2015) surveyed several countermeasures that could be used to mitigate various contemporary 
threats to privacy in both the digital and physical worlds. TrackMeNot (http://trackmenot.io/) was designed to limit the 
effectiveness of collecting a user’s search engine history by shrouding each query amongst additional searches, hiding 
the true search amongst useless noise. I Like What I See (https://github.com/sklise/i-like-what-i-see), was developed to 
automatically click every instance of the word “like” present on a given website, preventing others from knowing a 
Facebook user’s true interests. ScareMail (https://bengrosser.com/projects/scaremail/), another Chrome extension, 
appends nonsensical text to emails that is expected to be flagged by surveillance monitoring systems, such as the National 
Security Agency’s PRISM and XKeyscore programs. 
The Facial Weaponization Suite (http://zachblas.info/works/facial-weaponization-suite/) attempts to render facial 
recognition useless by wearing masks constructed based upon aggregated facial data. The Invisible kit 
(http://biogenfutur.es/) is an open source project consisting of two sprays, one designed to remove as much DNA as 
possible, and the other to obfuscate any that remains. Each of these highlighted countermeasures not only limit the usable 
information that is shared with certain systems or people, but intentionally seek to undermine and sabotage the intended 
purpose of collecting such data. 
5.5.3. Disinformation 
In addition to obfuscation, users can also employ disinformation to increase privacy (Whang, 2012). Alexander & 
Smith (2011, p. 58) defined disinformation as “intentional deception in communications scenarios” and described two 
primary types: destructive and constructive. Destructive disinformation would involve removing key information 
through redaction, whereas constructive might involve adding false information to a document. A simple example of 
disinformation would include using a fictitious persona to create an online account or subscribing to magazines to 
populate databases with inaccurate information as to who resides at a physical address. 
Although obfuscation and disinformation techniques can increase one’s privacy, employing them could potentially 
cause algorithms to be less reliable, undermining the value and effectiveness of big data. Therefore, organizations who 
desire a high level of accuracy must be aware that a growing percentage of consumer data will no longer be trustworthy. 
5.6. Property 
Mason’s conceptualization of the property issue focused primarily on questions related to data ownership, equitable 
exchange, and access to transmission channels. In the big data era, the reliance on cloud storage and Bring Your Own 
Device (BYOD) policies have further complicated the already difficult ownership issue. Secondary information use has 
resulted in data exchanges that are largely inequitable for the consumer. Debates over net neutrality also threaten to 
impede access to electronic information and resources. 
5.6.1. Bring Your Own Device 
Instead of issuing company-owned equipment, such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets to employees, organizations 
have largely adopted the BYOD approach (Shim, Mittleman, Welke, French, & Guo, 2013). While providing several 
benefits (e.g., accessibility, convenience, flexibility, employee satisfaction, productivity, innovation, and cost-savings), 
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this phenomenon also leads to several privacy and security implications, especially as it pertains to data breaches 
stemming from lost and stolen devices (Garba, Armarego, Murray, & Kenworthy, 2015). 
However, as Mason pointed out, there are even cloudier situations that have no obvious answers. For example, who 
owns the data stored on an employee's personal phone when it is used for business purposes? If the company owns the 
data, how can they access it if they do not own the device? Further, should organizations be able to compel employees 
to install applications on employee owned devices? 
With these questions in mind, it is easy to see how the BYOD approach also leads to numerous legal implications. 
Which laws and regulations apply to company BYOD policies largely depend on the sector the business is in and type 
of data collected. Companies need to sift through the data breach notification laws at the state and federal levels, state 
and federal laws and regulations on data security, international data protection laws, legal procedures that relate to 
eDiscovery, confidentiality obligations, contractual obligations, trade secret protection, and employment law related 
issues (Privacy Rights Clearninghouse, 2014). 
5.6.2. Right to Share 
Secondary information use refers to “the use of personal information for other purposes subsequent to the original 
transaction between an individual and an organization when the information was collected” (Culnan, 1993, p. 342). 
However, since terms and conditions are difficult and time consuming to read (McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Milne et al., 
2006), users are unlikely to be fully informed as to what the organization can do with their data. 
Further complicating this issue is the third-party doctrine, which essentially eliminates a user data rights, while 
granting organizations the “right to share” consumer data as they please (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology, 2014). The third-party doctrine is the legal proposition that people are not entitled to an expectation of 
privacy for information they voluntarily give to third parties. Therefore, the third-party doctrine currently applies to any 
data stored or processed through cloud services. Considering the digitization of every aspect of society, coupled with the 
shift back to centralized computing, users are left with little to no choice in preserving their privacy rights. 
For example, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court proclaimed that “what a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection” (Thompson, 2014). Numerous 
subsequent cases explained the relatively limited reach of the doctrine in the pre-digital age. The debate as to whether 
the third-party doctrine unnecessarily constricts the privacy rights of Americans has continued well into the digital age. 
5.7. Accessibility 
Mason’s original concern with respect to accessibility was that poor and disenfranchised communities would fall 
further behind due to limited access to information. While this fear did materialize, some could argue that the ease in 
which users can access information about others carries grave threats to personal privacy and safety. 
5.7.1. Access to Knowledge 
The Internet has drastically increased the amount of information available, yet many areas still lack access to reliable 
broadband connectivity due to infrastructure and transmission costs. Several efforts, such as OneWeb and SpaceX’s 
Starlink, are currently underway to reduce these costs and provide global access to broadband Internet by placing massive 
satellite constellations in much lower orbits to achieve lower latency than existing satellite Internet service providers (del 
Portillo, Cameron, & Crawley, 2018). As primary and secondary education continues to shift toward digital learning 
through laptops and tablets, the accessibility gap between the haves and have nots will only continue to grow. The 
accessibility issue has never been more evident than during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. With educational institutions 
and businesses suddenly forced to transition to online delivery and work-from-home conditions, those without a reliable 
Internet connection or access to necessary hardware and software suffered severe hardships. 
5.7.2. Too Much Access? 
“Just because something is publicly accessible does not mean that people want it to be publicized” (Boyd, 
2010). 
The technology that spawned the big data phenomenon has also made it possible for personal and sensitive 
information to be easily collected and disclosed on the Internet. When done intentionally, this form of cyberbullying 
behavior is commonly referred to as “doxing” due to the release of documents or information without the victim’s consent 
(Douglas, 2016; Li, 2018). Such information is commonly obtained through open-source intelligence (OSINT) gathering 
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techniques. Hackers regularly use OSINT to research individuals associated with their target organizations to increase 
the effectiveness of cyberattacks (Hayes & Cappa, 2018). 
These same techniques have also been used in “swatting” attacks where someone calls the police to make a false 
report, such as claiming that a hostage situation is taking place at the target’s residence, to cause a heavy police response 
(Jaffe, 2016; Li, 2018). The response typically involves deploying heavily armed SWAT (special weapons and tactics) 
teams, hence the name. Swatting attacks have been made against several celebrities, politicians, and other public figures, 
such as cybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs. The attack against Krebs was in retaliation for his story that identified a 
group of cybercriminals responsible for doxing public officials (Vaas, 2013, 2016). While these incidents were resolved 
without major harm, others have not been so fortunate. In 2015, the police chief for Sentinel, Oklahoma was shot by a 
homeowner when responding to a bomb threat called in by someone else (Slipke, 2015). In 2017, a dispute between 
Casey Viner and Shane Gaskill over an online video game resulted in an innocent man, Andrew Finch, being shot and 
killed by police as he exited his home in Wichita, Kansas (Jaffe, 2020). 
Other examples can be found in the documentary series Don’t F**k with Cats: Hunting An Internet Killer (Lewis, 
2019). Concerned citizens took it upon themselves to track down those responsible for producing and uploading several 
viral videos showing a man torturing and killing kittens. Members of a Facebook group conducted extensive OSINT 
activities and identified several potential suspects. A social media firestorm was waged against one of the early suspects 
after his information was doxed among the Facebook group. It was later determined that the suspect was not involved, 
but not before he tragically committed suicide under the weight of false accusations. While their efforts were underway, 
a group member who had used a pseudonym on her Facebook profile was sent a link to an unsettling video that showed 
someone walking through the Las Vegas casino where she worked. Although the group eventually identified the 
individual responsible for the videos, their efforts were not successful in preventing Luka Magnotta from escalating his 
crimes. He continued to post additional videos until he was ultimately arrested and convicted of murdering Jun Lin, an 
international student at Concordia University, in 2012. 
As these instances demonstrate, an affected individual or organization might be completely unaware that anyone is 
targeting them or that the sensitive information was available online until it has already resulted in harm. Thus, enhanced 
accessibility to data can also lead to disturbing and heartbreaking outcomes. 
5.7.3. Unauthorized Access 
While the personal computer ushered in distributed computing in the 1980s, emerging technologies are reverting to 
centralized computing due to the processing power needed to leverage big data. This trend increases the need for adequate 
connectivity for those who wish to adopt such systems. However, centralized databases also introduce several issues. 
For example, the push to convert patient data into Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) and increase access through 
health information exchanges can lead to security and privacy issues (Angst, 2010; Angst & Agarwal, 2009; Burns, 
Young, Ellis, Courtney, & Roberts, 2015). As we continue to desegregate data in the name of accessibility, we amplify 
breach magnitude and severity. 
Although there is a clear need for anonymity (Bellaby, 2018), anonymization methods and policies, such as statistical 
disclosure control, are routinely proven inadequate in protecting consumer privacy in the big data era (Riederer, Kim, 
Chaintreau, Korula, & Lattanzi, 2016). In 1997, when Massachusetts’ Group Insurance Commission decided to release 
records of hospital visits to researchers, Massachusetts governor William Weld gave reassurances that the data was 
anonymized and would not violate patient privacy (N. Anderson, 2009; Ohm, 2010). Sensing a challenge, Latanya 
Sweeney leveraged her research on U.S. Census and voter registration data (Sweeney, 2000), managed to identify Weld’s 
health information, and his diagnoses and prescriptions to him. 
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) demonstrated how users could be identified when using two separate data sources. 
Netflix, as part of their Netflix Prize data mining contest, had released over 100 million of what they believed to be 
sufficiently anonymized movie ratings from approximately 500,000 subscribers. When Narayanan and Shmatikov 
analyzed the ratings with similar data from Internet Movie Database (IMDb), they were able to identify anonymized 
Netflix ratings based upon public IMDb ratings. In discussing the implications of their study, Narayanan and Shmatikov 
(2008, p. 123) explained how seemingly worthless information could impact an individual’s privacy: 
First, his political orientation may be revealed by his strong opinions about “Power and Terror: Noam 
Chomsky in Our Times” and “Fahrenheit 9/11,” and his religious views by his ratings on “Jesus of 
Nazareth” and “The Gospel of John.” Even though one should not make inferences solely from someone’s 
movie preferences, in many workplaces and social settings opinions about movies with predominantly gay 
themes such as “Bent” and “Queer as folk” (both present and rated in this person’s Netflix record) would 
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be considered sensitive. In any case, it should be for the individual and not for Netflix to decide whether to 
reveal them publicly. 
Successful reidentification also occurred when researchers at the Whitehead Institute were interested in assessing the 
risk of sharing anonymized DNA data (Gymrek, McGuire, Golan, Halperin, & Erlich, 2013; Van Rijmenam, 2014). The 
team found that DNA data sets that have been stripped of identifiers can still be attributed to surnames by examining 
specific genetic data and then cross-referencing freely available data sources on the Internet. What is particularly 
dangerous is that individuals can jeopardize relatives by sharing their own DNA, all without informing or obtaining 
consent. Given the rise of genetic testing services that are marketed to the average consumer, such as 23andMe and 
Ancestry.com, these findings have serious implications for the privacy and security of genetic information. 
5.7.4. Data Breaches and Reporting 
With more and more data stored, used, and transferred for business purposes, data breaches are increasingly common. 
Despite the staggering number and scope of these data breaches, significant challenges for consumers and corporations 
are created due to a lack of consistent data protection framework (Tschider, 2015). Much like other areas regarding data 
and privacy, federal laws related to cybersecurity are sector specific. These laws include provisions in Gramm-Leach-
Bliley and the HIPPA Breach Notification Rule. 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive federal data breach notification and protection law does not seem likely anytime 
soon. Numerous bills, such as the Data Accountability and Trust Act (Rush, 2019), have been introduced recently in 
Congress, but have failed to gain traction. This bill, H.R. 1282 would require the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
require certain businesses and organizations to establish security practices for the treatment and protection of personal 
information and provide specified notice and offer credit-monitoring services in the event of a breach. 
Adding to the complication of sector specific laws, all 50 states currently have their own form of data breach 
notification statutes. Some of the definitions and requirements of the laws that can vary greatly include: 1) what type 
personally identifiable information triggers a breach notification obligation to individuals, 2) what form of data that 
information is in, 3) when notice must be given to individuals, 4) what form of that notice is permitted, 5) what must 
information about the breach must be included in the notice, 6) what states require notification to state agencies, and 7) 
when notification to the credit reporting agencies is required (Millar & Marshall, 2019). 
6. Discussion
6.1. Contributions to Literature 
Although Mason’s PAPA is just as relevant today as it was in 1986, we have highlighted several modern examples 
that we must consider as we usher in a new wave of technological advancement. Our extension also distinguished three 
issues that were deeply embedded within Mason’s framework but deserve increased attention. First, we examined how 
behavioral surveillance has become a significant threat to individual privacy and liberty. Second, we illustrated how data 
errors and misinterpretations can lead to devastating outcomes, especially when applied in high stakes situations. Third, 
we also explored how both industry and government have failed to properly regulate unethical behavior. Lastly, we 
revisited the four original issues comprising Mason’s PAPA by examining how technology has not only impacted our 
relationship with information, but more importantly one another. 
6.2. Practical Implications 
As we enter the 2020s, the mass proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) will likely be its most defining 
characteristic. Nearly every category of electronic device sold today has built-in connectivity, essentially eliminating 
any remaining firewall between the digital and physical worlds. We encourage professionals in all fields to assess the 
ethical implications of their work. Identifying potential issues during the infancy of any new endeavor allows for 
safeguards to be embedded during the development process. Employing an “ethical by design” approach to technology 
development would also better protect stakeholders by ensuring that adequate thought has been put into the ethical 
implications for each element of the system (Beard & Longstaff, 2018). 
6.3. Legal Implications 
With the confusing web of state and federal privacy laws, the onus remains primarily on individuals and corporations 
to reevaluate their behavior through the interpretation of statistical models and its application to governance. 
Corporations and industries have a direct impact on the behavior of individual consumers and should take steps to educate 
consumers beyond bare minimum informed consent requirements on how their data is collected and used. Individuals 
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must be able to understand the value their data has to corporations and how their everyday behavior contributes to the 
enhancement of that value. Additionally, corporations and even consumers still must advocate for strengthened privacy 
laws that protect consumers from forms of exploitation using their data. 
7. Conclusion
We have provided several contemporary examples that continue to demonstrate the importance of Mason’s seminal 
work. Each issue that Mason identified in his PAPA framework over 30 years ago is just as critical, if not more so, in 
the big data era. We also proposed our BIG PAPA extension to address emerging issues with respect to behavioral 
surveillance, interpretation of analytical models, and much needed governance. It is our hope that greater attention will 
be paid to these areas in both research and practice. We simply cannot afford to continue to ignore Mason’s warnings 
any longer. 
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